The Weimarization of the American Republic
The Weimarization of the American Republic
Matt talks with Aaron Sibarium, editor at the Free Beacon, about his latest essay, The Weimarization of the American Republic.
This week, I had Aaron Sibarium on the podcast to discuss his thought-provoking essay, The Weimarization of the American Republic.
Click here to listen to our full conversation.
The following excerpt has been edited for length and clarity:
Matt: For those who don't know exactly, or don't recall, what was Weimar?
Aaron: Yeah, so Weimar was the German liberal democracy between 1918 and 1933. So it was after the Kaiser was deposed in the German revolution, after World War I. And it lasted for, I guess, about 25 years until eventually, Hitler took power and inaugurated the Third Reich. Weimar is seen in sort of, you know, conventional historiography as an example of a deeply divided, very fragile, young democracy that just kind of crumbled under the weight of its own contradictions. And so it's famous for having the street brawls between communists and fascists, among other things. And so I had it in mind, during the summer, when in the wake of the George Floyd shooting, there were all these protests that turned violent, and you saw Antifa and the Proud Boys fighting in the street and police stations getting burned down. And I thought, “Oh, I don't know that much about Weimar Germany, but this sure sounds a little Weimar-esque, I should read some stuff about it, and I wonder if there are parallels.” And sure enough, as I was reading, a lot of parallels jumped out to me. So that's more or less how the essay was born.
Matt: Yeah, no, I've sort of just intuitively thought the same thing. But I didn't take the time to do that deep dive and to do the reading. And I didn't have the institutional knowledge. I mean, other than just the basics. Yeah, but you did it. And so you quote, for example, at the top of this essay, you quote, a Walter Laqueur.
Aaron: Yeah—
Matt: He's an American, who wrote a cultural history of Weimar, I think, in 1974, and, man, when you read the quote, what he is describing, it sounds like modern America. Was his book, one of the sort of fundamental, you know, books that you read when you were brushing up on this?
Aaron: Yeah, it wasn't the only one, I guess the first book I read was just like a broader sort of overview of the Weimar Republic. But the Laqueur book, I think, had the most stuff on the cultural dynamics, and particularly on how left and right intellectuals kind of ended up almost confirming each other's stereotypes. And, you know, I think there is this more revisionist strain of Weimar historiography that's kind of implicit now in a lot of the Antifa discourse, where people say, “Well, you know, before Nazi Germany, there were the fascists, and the anti-fascists were the good guys. Right?” Duh. And, in fact, you go back and look at it, the left-wing street fighters and the left-wing intellectuals in Weimar were not really good guys. I mean, they were—they were actually unrepentant communists—in many cases, they were violent. They, you know, justified political violence. They thought that the centrist, liberal parties were fascists. I mean, these guys were nuts. And they were not doing the legitimacy of the Republic any favors. So yeah, like, I mean, the Laqueur book goes through that in some length, and particularly talks a lot about the intellectual polarization in Germany, which is probably, to me, the parallel in some ways that hits closest to home—the polarization of sort of the intellectuals and the elite class, as well as the wake of oikophobia and the sort of hatred of the country.
Matt: You all start off by making the obvious point, which is like America is not exactly like Weimar. We have not lost a war nor we have been forced to pay debt. We've had 250 years of democracy, not 25. Trump is not Hitler. But then you write, you know, “what recalls Weimar Germany is not the chaos itself, but the way it has been excused, even encouraged by those notionally in a position to stop it, many of whom seem ambivalent about whether the republican threatens deserves defense.” This does seem to be a pretty good description of America today. Trump talks a lot about all the things America has done wrong. And his supporters view America as kind of soft and weak. And then people on the left, go to like the 1619 project and all that they're not terribly proud of America, either. So you end up having a lot of people on the left and the right who just aren't that committed to the Republic.
Aaron: Yeah, that's exactly right. And I mean, obviously, you know, you don't want to exaggerate. I mean, the Weimar Republic, you know, had only existed for a couple years, and it was a very different culture, different history and so, you know, I mean, I don't think that the, like oikophobia is quite as deeply rooted in the United States as in Weimar. But yes, I mean—
Matt: You’ve used this term twice. Oikophobia. This is like a hatred of your homeland or your country?
Aaron: Yeah, exactly. But you know, I think it's, it's become much stronger on the left in even just my exceedingly short lifetime. I was in high school, like, less than 10 years ago, and I would say the dominant sort of left, liberal culture then was critical of aspects of the United States, but ultimately saw progressive ideas and values as in some sense, advancing the Constitution or redeeming the country. And now, right with the 1619 project, I think there's a lot more ambivalence among the chattering class about whether the United States actually is a good country whose founding was, you know, on balance, a good thing worth honoring. And that's where sort of the Weimarization of the left has occurred a bit. And as you say, on the right, I think you're right, that there's a certain degree of maybe oikophobia among Trumpets and kind of the critique of America as soft and as having made all these mistakes. I would say that the most extreme form on the right, though, isn't really a Trumpism, which kind of wants to make America great, implying that there is some core of America that is great or can be great. I would say the most extreme form of oikophobia on the right is sort of the Patrick Deneen post-liberalism that has gained currency among some intellectuals. I mean, look, this is a quote from Patrick Dineen, I'm not making it up, it says, you know, the atomistic philosophy of the founders was always destined to dissolve our civic institutions. I mean, if you blame the founding of the country itself, for our kind of all of our problems today, it's hard to see how you can really be patriotic and hold such a view. I don't think that Patrick Deneen speaks for most Americans, or even most American intellectual conservatives, but I do think that his ideas would not have been really discussed to the degree that they have been discussed in the past four years had it not been for Trump. And so yes, I mean, there is a sense in which Trump has opened up the door on the right to much more radical critiques of the American project. And, you know, I wouldn't bet that Deneenism really goes anywhere. But on the other hand, you know, there were a lot of people who scoffed at ‘wokeness’ and thought, you know, back in the 70s, and 80s, all this stuff is BS, it can't go anywhere. And, you know, under the right conditions we've seen, it can go somewhere. So I wouldn't bet on Patrick Deneen taking over the American right. But I also do think that that strain of kind of right-wing post-liberalism, it's certainly gained more traction than anyone would have imagined in like, the 1990s, you know.
Matt: Yeah, totally. I mean, I'm, you know, I'm older than you. I remember the 1990s. And that era, I mean, there's always been something of romanticization of the left, but that didn't happen at all on the right. And even still, I mean, I think like John F. Kennedy and Bill Clinton were kind of portrayed as like the epitome of cool in politics. And so it was a very mainstream sort of thing. And speaking of what is cool, your essay talks about status in Weimar being attached to radicalism, “so most status seeking individuals sought to subvert the Republic, lest they be viewed as supporting it. If you like Weimar, you were either anti-German or anti-worker, and who wanted to be one of those.” Here's what I find interesting about this. There are some people who are true ideologues, but a lot of people just want to be cool or famous. So if you want to be a political rockstar, like AOC, or whoever's, you know, Marjorie Taylor Green, if you want to be famous in politics, what are the incentives?
Aaron: Yeah, I mean, I think that's completely true. And social media obviously hasn't helped with that at all. That's one thing that Weimar did not have. But yeah, I do think what strikes me is that it's kind of cool or chic or edgy to float these radical theories about the fundamental depravity of the United States. So, on the left, obviously, 1619, you know, America founded on slavery, racism, and you see AOC. I mean, she basically recapitulates all that rhetoric. I'm not sure that she frames it in maybe the most maximalist terms as say, Nicole Hannah Jones, or some other journalists might, but you know, she certainly flirts with the rhetoric. And then on the right, I can say from experience that among kind of young intellectual conservatives, the cool hip, edgy thing is kind of wink and a nod flirting with monarchy, or some crazy anti-American kind of right-wing romanticism. It's not totally serious, but it you know, it's seen as kind of cool or hip, if you are into a kind of like secular, neo-reactionary thought on some corners of the internet, that's kind of seen as cooler, edgy… I'm not sure how ideological all of it is, right? I don't know if either the kind of performative young intellectuals in DC, or the performative, woke, squad in Congress, deeply believe all this, you know. Maybe they believe it, but it's not a particularly deeply-held belief. But I do think that it's just mimetically kind of seen as a cool hip thing, and that does affect culture, and that does affect politics in the long run if what is socially valued is radicalism. You know, you don't have to necessarily believe in it on a deep fundamental level for it to still be a problem. Indeed, even in Weimar, a lot of the street fighters weren't actually all that ideologically committed. And the reason you know, that is a lot of the street fighters switched sides. There was this very well known pattern that both the communists and the fascists complained about where they had trouble retaining their recruits, because they'd sort of be like, “Oh, yeah, you know, we like the fascists. We like beating up commies. Oh, but like, the communists are really getting edgier and more militant, I don't know, maybe we should go over to that side.” And some of them really did [switch], because it was more about just wanting to fight and wanting to be radical and against the system. So, you know, people will say things like, “Well, do these kids really believe in what they're saying?” And they don't necessarily have to believe it, for it to be harmful.